










Center	 (IUC)	 Dubrovnik,	 Henning	 Ottmann	
and	Pavo	Barišić.	This	book	of	proceedings	
is	precisely	the	result	of	one	of	the	conferen-
ces	 held	 at	 the	 IUC,	 from	which	 it	 delivers	
10	 contributions	 signed	 by,	 in	 order,	 Pavo	
Barišić,	 Stefano	 Saracino,	 Marita	 Brčić	
Kuljiš,	 Hans-Otto	 Mühleisen,	 Karl-Heinz	
Nusser,	Sulejman	Bosto,	Klaus–Gerd	Giesen,	
Olga	 Simova,	 Jörg	Wernecke,	 and	 Henning	




content	 of	 the	 Proceedings	 is	 divided	 into	
five	sections:	“On	 the	Roots	of	Deliberative	
Democracy	in	the	Thought	of	Antiquity”	(Zu 
den Wurzeln der deliberativen Demokratie im 
Denken der Antike),	“Deliberative	Democracy	
in	the	View	of	Other	Authors”	(Die Idee der 
deliberativen Demokratie im Spiegel anderer 
Denker),	“The	Question	of	Deliberative	De-
mocracy	 in	 Habermas’	 theory”	 (Fragen zur 
deliberativen Demokratie bei Jürgen Haber-
mas),	“Deliberative	Democracy	and	the	EU”	
(Die deliberativen Demokratie und die EU),	
and	“Plans	and	Prospects	of	Deliberative	De-
mocracy”	 (Chancen und Möglichkeiten der 
deliberativen Demokratie).
Through	 this	 structure,	 the	 book	 covers	 the	
overall	 theme	 of	 deliberative	 democracy:	
from	its	origins	in	Antiquity,	through	its	analy-
sis	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 theories	 of	
contemporary	 authors,	 especially	Habermas,	
and	to	the	opening	of	the	current	debates	on	
its	 prospects	 and	 perspectives,	 particularly	
within	the	framework	of	the	European	Union.
The	 idea	 of	 deliberative	 democracy	 is	 quite	
relevant	 today,	 particularly	 in	 the	 discus-
sions	 on	 the	 democratization	 of	 the	 Euro-
pean	Union	and	 the	participation	of	citizens	
in	 political	 decision-making.	The	 awareness	
of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 existing	 system	 of	
representative	 parliamentary	 democracy	 and	
of	 the	 political	 apathy	 it	 entails	 has	 encour-
aged	the	two	key	debates:	the	one	on	the	post-







classical	 representative	 democracy	based	 on	
the	principle	of	voting,	has	genuine	delibera-
tion	 (from	 Latin	 deliberare	 –	 (to	 consider)	
consciously,	 deliberately)	 as	 its	 foundation,	






the	 human	 democratic	 form	 the	 purpose	 of	






both	 with	 the	 classical	 immediate	 or	 direct	









The	 term	 “deliberative	 democracy”	 was	
coined	by	J.	M.	Bessette	in	1980	in	his	epon-














This	 is	 precisely	 what	 Pavo	 Barišić	 wrote	
about:	 in	 the	first	article	 in	 the	Proceedings,	
he	presented	Aristotle’s,	the	earliest	vision	of	








ter	 is	 found	 in	Aristotle.	According	 to	 him,	




Following	 this	 article,	 which	 introduces	 us	
to	 the	 contemporary	 debate	 on	 deliberative	
democracy	 through	 Aristotle,	 the	 next	 two	






Stefano	 Saracino	 wrote	 about	 the	 modern	
understanding	 of	 deliberation	which,	 on	 the	
one	 hand,	 designates	 internal	 dialogue	 and,	
on	 the	other	 hand,	marks	 a	 discursive	 inter-
subjective	 form	 of	 discussion.	 He	 focused	
on	John	Milton	and	Thomas	Hobbes,	whom	
he	 found	 interesting	 for	 the	 reason	 that,	 in	
his	 work	 “Structural	 Transformation	 of	 the	
Public	Sphere:	an	Inquiry	into	a	Category	of	
Bourgeois	Society”	(German: Strukturwandel 
der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer 
Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft),	
Habermas	relied	on	them	as	the	antipodes	in	




dom	 (civil	 liberty),	 Hobbes	 considered	 the	
question	of	deliberation	from	the	perspective	
of	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty.	What	 is	 par-
ticularly	 interesting	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 John	
Milton,	 considering	 that	 research	 indicates	
that	the	political	semantics	found	in	his	work	
Aeropagitica	 (published	 in	 1644)	 consider-




her	 thesis	 is	 the	 article	 “The	 Idea	 of	 Public	
Reason	Revisited”	in	which	Rawls	presented	
his	belief	that	the	idea	of	the	public	mind,	the	











the	principle	of	 consensually	 also	 supported	
this.	Her	thesis	is,	however,	that	such	attitude	




Following	 Brčić	 Kuljiš,	 there	 is	 a	 number	
of	 contributions	 by	 Hans-Otto	 Mühleisen,	
Karl-Heinz	 Nusser	 and	 Sulejman	 Bosto	 on	
Habermas’	understanding	of	deliberative	de-
mocracy.
Hans-Otto	 Mühleisen	 presented	 a	 new	 cri-
tique	 of	Habermas’	 reflection	 on	 the	 theory	











the	work Between Facts and Norms: Contri-
butions to a Discourse Theory of Law and De-
mocracy	 (German:	 Faktizität und Geltung).	
Here	 Habermas	 establishes	 human	 rights	 in	
the	discourse	as	subjective	rights,	which	have	
validity	 only	 as	 a	 derivative	 of	 democratic	
rights.	 The	 author	 criticizes	 his	 standpoints	







also	 criticizes	 Habermas’	 idea	 of	 a	 global	
deliberative	 democracy	 based	 on	 the	 moral	
judgment	of	human	rights	by	means	of	pub-







In	 the	 last	 article	 in	 this	 section,	 on	 the	 ba-
sis	 of	 Habermas’	 argument	 Sulejman	 Bosto	
critically	 examined	 the	question	of	 the	 rela-
tionship	 between	 tolerance	 and	 post-secular	
society,	 especially	 in	 times	 of	 post-secular	
“reappearance”	 of	 religion	 and	 its	 require-
ments.	The	fourth	section	of	the	Proceedings,	
dedicated	 to	 questioning	 the	 concrete	 possi-
bilities	 of	 realizing	 deliberative	 democracy	
in	 the	 European	 Union,	 is	 also	 focused	 on	
Habermas.	 The	 consistency	 of	 Habermas’	
following	of	the	general	requirements	for	de-
liberative	 democracy	 and	 his	 understanding	
of	 the	Eurozone	 crisis	 is	 analysed	 by	Klaus	
Gerd-Giesen	 while	 Olga	 Simova	 focused	
on	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	necessity	and	general	
possibility	of	democracy	at	transnational	and	
global	level.
In	 the	 last	 section,	 dedicated	 to	 the	 analysis	
of	 the	prospects	 (chances	and	opportunities)	
of	 deliberative	 democracy,	we	 can	 find	 two	
contributions	by	Jörg	Wernecke	and	Henning	











lem,	and	 that	he	 saw	a	positive	 impact	both	
on	the	individual	development	of	persons	and	






















the	 internal	 consistency	of	 the	 theory	 to	 the	








the	European	Union	 and	 the	 recent	 collapse	
of	the	global	economy,	are	the	central	assign-














In	 his	 previous	 essay,	 “Action	 and	 Inquiry	
in	 Dewey’s	 Philosophy”	 (2007),	 Melvin	 L.	
Rogers	 contends	 that	 John	 Dewey	modifies	
Aristotle’s	 epistemic	 categories	 (episteme,	
phronesis,	 and	 techne)	 and	 thereby	 offers	 a	
theory	 of	 person	 and	 inquiry	 that	 post-Ana-




Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and 
the Ethos of Democracy.	This	time,	however,	


















which	 is	 a	 core	 concept	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	
way	of	life.	He	opens	his	discussion	by	rais-
ing	a	question	as	follows:	“In	the	absence	of	
unifying	 theological	 commitments,	 how	 do	
we	go	about	the	business	of	managing	demo-
cracy	while	simultaneously	paying	respect	to	
religious	 commitment?”	 (xi).	 Rogers	makes	
a	claim	of	religious	naturalism	that	men	can	
live	 a	 religious	 life	 that	 is	 “pious	 without	
lapsing	 into	 blind	 deference	 and	 so	 threat-




given	 the	 conditions,	men	 realize	 their	 indi-
vidualities	 that	would	 otherwise	 remain	 po-
tential,	and	fully	function.	(Cf.	John	Dewey,	
“Creative	Democracy	–	The	Task	Before	Us,”	
1939,	 (LW	 14:226))	 For	 Rogers,	 those	 reli-
gious	 men	 are	 democratically	 participatory	
citizens.	They	are	cooperatively	deliberative	
(or	 intelligent)	 to	construct	 (or	 improve)	 the	
milieu	whereto	 their	 better	 potentialities	 ac-
tualize	themselves.	When	inquiring	into	situ-
ations,	 they	 work	 together	 to	 identify	 their	
problems	and	resolve	them	in	such	a	way	as	
to	 manifest	 the	 democratic	 ideal,	 which	 is	
all-around	human	growth.	These	democratic	
inquirers	do	not	hold	the	dictatorship	of	fixed	
morality.	 Normative	 authority	 is	 not	 given	
from	 the	 outside,	 but	 rather	within	 their	 ac-
tivity	of	democratic	 inquiry.	The	democratic	
inquirers	admit	their	fallibility.	They	are	hum-






Despite	 the	 danger	 of	 being	 somewhat	 re-
dundant,	I	clarify	each	chapter’s	points	made	
by	 Rogers,	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 how	 civic	
religiosity,	 democracy,	 and	 morality	 are	 in-
tertwined.	His	book	consists	of	five	chapters,	
which	 are	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 In	 Part	 I	
(From	 Certainty	 to	 Contingency),	 Rog-
ers	attempts	 to	offer	a	 revisionist	 reading	of	







In	 Chapter	 1	 (Protestant	 Self-Assertion	 and	
Spritual	 Sickness),	 Rogers	 puts	 Dewey	 in	
a	 three	 way	 of	 conversation	 with	 Calvinist	
theologian	 Charles	 Hodge	 and	 liberal	 Prot-
estants,	such	as	Henry	Ward	Beecher,	Lyman	




view	 can	 be	 a	 candidate	 of	 the	 moral	 idea	












ternative	 to	Hodge’s	 reactionism	 and	 liberal	
Protestants’	modernism.	Rogers	criticizes	that	






be	 a	 naturalist	 progressivism	 or	 progressive	
naturalism	with	which	fallibility	and	transac-
tionalism	 are	 presupposed.	 It	 is	 correspond-
ent	to	moral	pluralism	and	links	the	self	to	the	
world.	 According	 to	 Rogers,	 Dewey	 builds	
this	progressivism	by	accepting	Darwin’s	sci-





understands	 men	 and	 their	 religious,	 pious	
lives	in	the	contingent	Darwinian	nature,	and	
advocates	transactionalism:	“there	is	transac-
tion	 relationship	 among	 self,	 other,	 and	 the	
world	–	resulting	from	the	movement	of	and	
disruption	 in	 life	(what	he	called	‘problem’)	
–	 that	 generates	 and	 structures	 frameworks	
of	 meaning”	 (48).	 Rogers	 argues	 that	 this	
transactionalism	 allows	Dewey	 to	 avoid	 the	
pitfalls	 that	 can	 present	 serious	 metaphysi-
cal	 and	 epistemological	 problems	 emerging	
out	of	Hodge’s	Calvinism	and	liberal	Protes-
tantism.	Metaphysical	 problem	 refers	 to	 the	












and	 agency	 is	 not	 an	 intellectual	 atom	 con-








believes	 that	 through	 their	 inquiring	 action,	
men	 improve	 their	 environing	 conditions.	









project	 to	 resolve	 problems	 they	 are	 faced	
with,	are	fallible.	Accepting	fallibility,	inquir-
ers	are	humble.	However,	this	does	not	mean	
that	 they	 lose	hope.	With	hope,	“humility	 is	
the	 gift	 of	 inquiry”	 (101).	 In	 other	 words,	
their	 inquiring	action	would	not	be	possibly	








make	 their	 environing	 conditions	 better	 and	
more	fruitful.	At	the	end	of	the	Preface	of	the	
book,	 Rogers	 delivers	 a	 central	 message	 of	
the	book:	 “The	defining	 feature	of	Dewey’s	
philosophy	 (…)	 is	 an	 understanding	 of	 hu-

















book,	The Machiavellian Moment	 and	 is	 re-
peated	by	many	who	have	been	influenced	by	
it.)	In	Part	II,	Rogers	contends	that	this	read-
ing	 of	Aristotle’s	 politics	 is	 not	 correct.	 He	
sees	that	Dewey	corrects	this	misreading	and	
offers	 a	 democratic	 ethics	 and	 a	 pragmatic	
theory	of	democracy.	Rogers	recognizes	that	
for	Dewey,	the	best	political	regime	that	was	
imagined	 by	Aristotle	 is	 not	 the	 aristocratic	
republic	where	 a	 few	 educated	 elites	whose	
minds	 are	 self-restraint	 govern	 for	 the	 good	
of	all,	but	the	kind	of	participatory	democratic	





how	 the	 common	 good	 can	 be	 formed	 and	
achieved.	 In	 short,	 Rogers	 reads	 Dewey	 as	
Aristotelian	 of	 participatory	 republicanism,	
who	 advocates	 a	 small	 participatory	 demo-







shape	 to	 the	 problems	 that	 are	 only	 dimly	
perceived	 by	 both	 citizens	 and	 political	 of-




problems	 and	 assessing	 potential	 proposals”	
–	as	rootless:	“there	is	no	reason	to	posit	this	
(conception)	 as	 fundamental	 to	 human	 psy-
chology	 and	 human	 socialization,	 precisely	
because	citizens	invariably	move	away	from	
or	 rethink	 the	belief	 they	hold”	 (parenthesis	
is	mine,	201).
Rogers	 notes	 that	 Dewey	 conceives	 demo-
cratic	 citizens	 as	 deliberative	 and	 informed	
elaborates.	This	is	critical	insofar	as	citizens	
have	 been	 deemed	 incapable	 of	 managing	
powers	 in	politics	over	 themselves	 and	 thus	
some	intellectuals	like	Lippermann	have	em-
braced	 the	 practice	 of	 political	 elitism.	 For	
Dewey,	 they	 are	 capable	of	 addressing	 their	
moral	and	socio-political	problems	and	adept	





In	 Chapter	 3	 (Faith	 and	 Democratic	 Piety),	
Rogers	 articulates	Dewey’s	 concept	of	 civic	






writes:	 “what	Dewey	 (…)	wants	 to	 identify	
as	religious”	is	those	forms	of	experience	that	
“intensify	 and	 deepen	 our	 communion	 with	
the	 large	world”	 (125–126).	When	 it	 is	 nar-
rowly	or	mistakenly	used	to	indicate	a	feature	
of	organized	religion	or	a	property	of	institu-
tions,	 religious	 life	 is	meant	 as	 a	 life	 living	









Rogers	 recognizes	 that	 in	 this	 Deweyan	 re-




(For	 Rogers’	 full	 articulation	 of	 the	 phrase,	
see:	 126–136).	 Rogers	 urges	 his	 audiences	
to	“understand	piety	and	faith	as	democratic	
virtues”	 (italics are	 mine,	 127).	 Men	 who	
cultivate	themselves	toward	those	“religious”	
traits	of	character	are	deemed	democratically	
virtuous.	They	 are	 pious,	 but	 not	 in	 a	 sense	
that	 their	 lives	 and	 experience	 are	 incor-
porated	 to	 the	 order	 of	 supernatural	 beings	
or	 objects	 as	 fixed	 and	 related	 to	 infallible	
dogmas	 behind	 this	 order.	 Instead,	 they	 are	
democratic	in	their	lives	and	expand	the	ho-




pragmatist	 ethics,	 there	 is	 a	 connection	 be-
tween	morality	and	democracy,	and	attempts	
to	 explain	 this	 linkage.	 For	 Dewey,	 moral	
inquiry	 is	 not	 a	 pure	 reason-based	 and	 au-
tonomous	action	to	give	 the	moral	 laws	that	
are	 completely	 independent	 of	 environing	
conditions.	 It	 is	 rather	 a	 cooperatively	 in-
telligent	 action	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	
–	wherein	morality	 lies	–	 to	address	various	
socio-political	 and	 economic	 issues	 in	 con-
temporary	 pluralist	 world.	 “Moral	 conflict”	
between	diverse	views	of	issues	emerges	and	
“deliberation”	is	thus	required	to	resolve	the	
conflict	 that	 would	 otherwise	 develop	 into	
culture	war	 (170).	Rogers	supports	Dewey’s	





drances	 to	human	growth	 and	 the	 actualiza-




lead	 to	 all-around	 flourishing	 of	 human	 life	
(170).	 Rogers	 concludes	 the	 chapter	 that	 as	
such,	 moral	 inquiry	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	
best	method	to	pursue	the	quest	for	the	com-
mon	good	in	our	pluralist	world.
I	 have	 reviewed	 each	 chapter	 in	 a	 reversed	
way	 because	 I	 feel	 that	Rogers’s	 reading	 of	
Dewey’s	 theory	 of	 democracy	 should	 be	
highlighted	in	his	moral	philosophy.	Dewey’s	







tion	 as	 the	 kind	 of	 “utilitarianism’s	 calcula-
tive	 understanding	 of	 deliberation”	 because	
this	 “calculative	 approach	 undercuts	 the	 de-
liverances	 of	 the	 imagination,	 and	 in	 some	
instances	 simply	 ignores	 them	 altogether”	
(177).	It	is	referred	to	as	the	imaginative	ac-
tion	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 “have	 access	 to”	 and	
“focus	on	funded	experiences	for	future	pos-
sibilities”	(176).
Rogers	 offers	 a	 great	 insight	 into	 Dewey’s	
moral	life,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	his	under-
standing	 of	 deliberation-based	 moral	 life	 is	
limited,	 since	 he	 does	 not	 include	 a	 discus-
sion	of	Dewey’s	theory	of	democratic	virtues.	




constructive	 activity	 by	 which	 individuals	
work	together	to	create	the	proper	conditions,	
thereby	 actualizing	 their	 individualities	 that	
might	otherwise	 remain	merely	potential.	 In	
his	 recent	book,	Human Eros: Eco-ontology 
and the Aesthetics of Existence,	Thomas	Al-
exander	writes:	 “the	core	of	democratic	vir-
tues	lie	in	the	ability	to	learn	the	art	of	living	





Eros: Eco-ontology and the Aesthetics of Ex-
istence,	New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	
2013,	202.)	For	Dewey,	moral	life	refers	to	a	
form	 of	 life	 constrained	 by	 democratic	 vir-
tues.	Living	moral	life	is	bringing	democracy	
(understood	 in	 terms	 of	 civic	 religiosity)	 to	
our	 problematic	 situations.	 Democratically	
virtuous	 men	 are	 the	 participatory	 republi-





of	 democratic	 virtues	 should	 have	 been	 ar-








The Routledge Handbook of 




The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary 
Philosophy of Religion	was	edited	by	Graham	
Oppy,	 professor	 of	 philosophy	 at	 Monash	
University	in	Australia,	and	a	co-editor	of	the	
multivolume	 work	 The History of Western 
Philosophy of Religion,	and	author	of	Onto-
logical Arguments and Belief in God,	Arguing 
about Gods,	 Philosophical Perspectives on 
Infinity,	The Best Argument against God,	Re-
inventing Philosophy of Religion,	Describing 
Gods: An Investigation of Divine Attributes,	
and	 co-author	 of	 Reading Philosophy of 
Religion.	 This	 handbook	 is	 an	 outstanding	
reference	 source	 to	 all	 topics	 and	 problems	
concerning	 religion,	 science,	 philosophy,	
and	 contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	




and	 concepts.	 More	 than	 thirty	 professors,	
scholars	 and	 researches	 have	 contributed	 to	
this	outstanding	handbook	with	their	essays,	
writing	 about	 various	 topics	 which	 include	
anything	 ranging	 from	 traditional	 concep-
tions	of	divinity,	to	religion	and	cognitive	sci-




at	 Central	 Michigan	 University,	 and	 author	
of	the	book	Minds and Gods: The Cognitive 
Foundations of Religion,	and	Michael	Levin,	
philosophy	 professor	 at	 City	 University	 of	
New	York.
First	 part	 of	 the	book	deals	with	 theoretical 
orientations	 which	 takes	 six	 different	 ap-
proaches	to	religion.	Chapter	one	of	the	book	
deals	 with	 “Feminist	 Approaches	 to	 Reli-
gion”,	written	by	Beverley	Clack.	In	short,	it	
deals	with	 feminist	 theology	which	 includes	
the	 problems	 of	 sexuality	 and	 identity	 be-
cause	 it	 is	 impossible,	 for	 them,	 to	 consider	
spirituality	and	belief	in	God	without	under-
standing	 how	 sexuality	 and	 gender	 affects	





that	 the	concept	of	God	 is	 entirely	a	human	
creation	which	then	holds	certain	beliefs	and	
values.	From	there,	Feurerbach	and	feminist	




Chapter	 two	 then	 takes	a	different	 approach	
–	“Phenomenological	Approach	to	Religion”.	
Basically,	 this	 chapter	 deals	 with	 phenom-
enology	 and	 phenomenological	method,	 de-
veloped	by	philosopher	Edmund	Husserl,	and	
religion.	 In	 other	 words,	 John	 Panteleimon	
Manoussakis,	the	author	of	this	chapter,	tries	
to	define	what	 religion	 is	when	we	 take	 the	
phenomenological	 approach	 to	 it.	The	prob-
lem	surfaced,	author	claims,	at	the	beginning	
of	the	twentieth	century	when	science	tried	to	
examine	 religion	 from	 its	 own	 perspective.	
For	 example,	Durkheim	 tried	 to	 define	 reli-
















Logan	 Paul	 Gage,	 thematises	 “New	 Athe-
ist	Approaches	 to	 Religion”.	 To	 be	 precise,	
this	 chapter	gives	criticism	 to	New	Atheism	
conceived	by	Richard	Dawkins,	Christopher	
Hitchens,	 Sam	 Harris	 and	 Daniel	 Dennett	
and	their	arguments	against	God’s	existence.	
























to	 assess	 the	 effects	 of	 foundationalism	 and	
empiricism	upon	religious	belief”	(p.	89).
Second	part	 of	 the	book	deals	with	concep-
tions of divinity,	 in	 chapters	 “Cosmology,	
Divinity	 and	 Self-Cultivation	 in	 Chinese	
Thought”,	“Islamic	Conceptions	of	Divinity”,	
“Hindu	Models	 of	 Divinity”	 and	 “Christian	
Conceptions	of	God”.
When	 writing	 about	 Chinese	 thought,	 au-
thor	Karyn	L.	Lai	focuses	on	Confucian	and	
Daoist	characteristics	of	religious	belief.	She	
explains	 the	 purpose	 of	 divination	 as	 rela-










history.	Also,	 at	 the	very	 end	of	 the	 chapter	







which	 are	 reports	 describing	 the	words	 and	
actions	 of	 Muhammad.	 Ajiaz,	 through	 dis-
cussing	attributes	of	God	that	are	mentioned	
in	those	two	sources,	claims	that	Islamic	re-
ligion	 and	 its	 God	 does	 not	 necessarily	 fall	
under	 the	 standard	 theism	 in	which	 exists	 a	
omnipotent	and	omnibenevolent	God	like,	for	
example,	 in	Christianity.	Ajiaz	 explains	 that	
it	is	necessary	to	understand	concept	of	God	
because	 it	 will	 affect	 our	 religious	 commit-
ment	 towards	Him.	He	 then	proceeds	 to	ex-
amine	God’s	transcendence	and	how,	because	
of	that,	 it	 is	irrational	to	believe	in	Him.	On	
top	 of	 that,	 he	 adds	 that	 Islamic	God	 is	 not	
omnibenevolent	 because	 He	 does	 not	 love	




Next	 chapter	 deals	 with	 Hindu	 models	 of	
divinity,	 namely	 “Divinity	 in	 the	 Vedas”,	
“Nyāya	 Concept	 of	 God”,	 “Popular	 Hindu	
Traditions	 and	 Their	 Concepts	 of	 God”,	






130).	According	 to	 her,	 not	 even	 gods	 have	
power	over	Rta.	Contrary	to	the	Vedas,	Nyāya	
scholars	put	God	in	the	centre	of	their	belief	
system.	He	 is	 the	 cause	of	 the	universe,	 ac-
cording	 to	 the	 three	 sūtras	 presented	 in	 this	
chapters.	 God	 presented	 by	Nyāya	 scholars	
does	not	create	the	world	ex nihilo,	like	Chris-
tian	God	does,	but	rather	He	only	arranges	at-
oms	 that	 already	 exists.	Vedānta	 concept	 of	
God	somewhat	portrays	pantheism,	claiming	
that	 the	world	 is	God’s	body,	 in	which	 term	
‘body’	means	“any	substance	of	a	conscious	
being	 which	 can	 be	 entirely	 controlled	 and	








sole	 object	 of	worship	 and	 an	 ultimate	 pro-
ductive	cause.
Jerome	 Gelman	 opens	 the	 third	 part	 of	 the	
book	with	 chapter	 about	 “Religious	Experi-
ence”,	 which	 is	 “an	 experience	 purportedly	
granting	 acquaintance	 with,	 or	 supporting	
belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of,	 realities	 or	 states	
of	affairs	of	a	kind	not	accessible	by	way	of	
sense	 perception,	 somatosensory	modalities,	
or	 standard	 introspection	 and	 having	 reli-
gious	meaning	for	the	subject”	(p.	155).	Au-
thor	claims	that	philosophers	have	advanced	
three	approaches	when	 it	comes	 to	 religious	
experience,	 namely	 “Swineburne’s	 Principle	
of	Credulity”,	“Alston’s	Doxatic	Practice	Ap-




the	 conception	 of	 faith	 in	Aquinas’	 Summa 
Theologiae.	For	Aquinas,	the	act	of	faith	does	





















tion,	 namely	 “improper	 worship	 of	 the	 true	
God,	 idolatry,	 divination	 or	 consulting	 with	
demons,	 and	 vain	 observances,	 such	 as	 the	
use	of	amulets	or	other	purportedly	magical	




ics and religious language.	 It’s	 first	 chapter	
is	written	by	Michael	Scott,	named	“Realism	
and	Anti-Realism”	and	it	deals	with	both	rea-
list	 and	 anti-realist	 positions	 of	 interpreting	




truth	 conditions	 of	 religious	 sentences;	 and	
the	third	focuses	on	the	meaning	of	religious	
utterances.
Next	 chapter,	 written	 by	 Roger	 M.	 White,	
“Analogy,	Metaphor,	and	Literal	Language”,	
discusses	 how	 is	 it	 possible	 to	 use	 human	















scientific	method	and	applies	 it	 to	 the	 inter-
pretations	 of	 religious	 texts,	 namely	 Bayes’	
theorem,	 and	 linguistic	method	 called	 stylo-
metrics	which	 shows	us	 the	 structure	or	 au-
thorship	of	texts	by	“analysing	their	statistical	
characteristics”	(p.	232).
Last	 chapter	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 book	 deals	
with	“Metaphysics	and	Religion”,	written	by	
Kevin	Hart.	Author	 deals	with	 several	 posi-
tions	 in	 Christianity	 and	 their	 adoptions	 of	
some	 aspects	 of	metaphysics.	 First,	 there	 is	
metaphysics	in	service	of	natural	theology	in,	
for	 example,	 scholasticism	 or	 in	 contempo-
rary	analytic	philosophy.	Second,	metaphys-
ics	is	bracketed	into	theologies.	For	example,	
“Kant’s	 attempt	 to	 bring	 religion	within	 the	
limits	of	bare	reason”	(p.	246),	or	“medieval	
contemplative	 theologies	 that	 prize	 affectus	
over	 intellectus”	 (p.	 246),	 and	 so	 on.	 Third	
and	 last	 is	 the	 restraining	 of	 metaphysics	
which	was	started	by	Friedrich	Nietzsche.
Fifth	part	of	the	book	thematises	religion and 




religion	 should	 take	 into	 account	 different	
religious	traditions	and	their	ties	to	their	cor-
responding	philosophical	traditions.
A	 very	 short	 chapter	 written	 by	 Marci	 A.	
Hamilton	on	“Religion	in	the	Public	Square”,	
deals	 with	 “how	 those	 advocating	 for	 reli-
gious	entities	have	borrowed	the	term	‘public	
square’	from	the	Supreme	Court’s	free	speech	
doctrine	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 gain	 leverage	 for	
their	public	policy	positions”	(p.	270).





is	 an	 illusion	 and	 it	 cannot	 be	 achieved.	He	
presents	 his	 arguments	 for	 intellectual	 in-
tolerance	 of	 religious	 beliefs	 throughout	 the	
chapter,	claiming	that	 intolerance	is	more	of	
a	 virtue	 than	 a	 vice.	He	 does	 that	 in	 a	way	
that	he	gives	us	standard,	accepted	arguments	




Last	 chapter	 of	 the	 fifth	 part	 of	 the	 book	
somewhat	 compliments	 the	 chapter	 before.	
Daniel	 J.	 McKaughan	 writes	 about	 “Reli-
gious	Violence”	and	its	occurrences	through-
out	the	history.	Concerned	about	religion	and	











Religion and ethics	 is	 the	 topic	 of	 the	 sixth	
part	 of	 the	 book,	 and	 it	 starts	 with	 chapter	





David	 S.	Oderberg	 takes	Christianity	 as	 the	
paradigm	 for	 discussing	 the	 connection	 be-








written	 by	 Neil	 Levy,	 examines	 three	 argu-




claims	 that	 all	 three	 arguments	 are	 weak,	




fering	 is	 the	central	element	of	all	 religions.	
In	 recent	 decades,	 the	 problem	 of	 suffering	
transformed	 into	 the	 problem	 of	 evil	 due	 to	
the	“contemporary	analytic	philosophy	of	re-










between	 secular	 and	 religious	morality,	 and	
then	focuses	on	the	religious	morality,	claim-
ing	 that	 it	 is	 grounded	 in	 relations	 between	
human	person	and	a	divine	person	that	must	
follow	 certain	 requirements,	 such	 as	 fear of 




chapter	 “Religion	 and	 Reason”,	 written	 by	
Robert	C.	Koons.	In	four	chapters	he	exam-

















The	 third	 topic	deals	with	“the	 relations	be-
tween	 institutionalized	 religion	 and	 modern	
scientific	 practice”	 (p.	 402),	 and	 the	 fourth	








Author	 then	 proceeds	 giving	 three	 theories,	
ranging	 from	 anthropomorphic projections	
and	 sociological theories,	 to	 Freudian psy-
chological theories.
To	 conclude	 this	 book	 review,	 a	 lot	 of	ma-
terial	 is	 presented	 within	 the	 covers	 of	 this	
handbook.	It	 is	well	written	and	has	a	lot	of	
information	 that,	 although	only	 introductory	
and	 somewhat	 summarised,	 provide	 a	 good	
insight	 into	 wide	 range	 of	 topics	 concern-
ing	 contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 It	
should	be	noted,	in	addition	to	already	great	
essays,	 that	bibliography	on	 the	very	end	of	
the	book	provides	enough	material	for	further	
reading	and	deepening	the	already	interesting	
array	of	topics.
Augustin	Kvočić
